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The power of elections in Africa revisited / Staffan I. Lindberg -- The relative powerlessness of elections in Latin America / Jennifer L. McCoy and Jonathan Hartlyn -- Elections as levers of democratization: a global inquiry / Jan Teorell and Axel Hadenius -- Post-Cold War political regimes: when do elections matter? / Philip G. Roessler and Marc M. Howard -- Harbinger of democracy: competitive elections before the end of authoritarianism / Jason Brownlee -- All elections are not the same: why power-sharing elections strengthen democratization / Pippa Norris -- Sources of competition under electoral authoritarianism / Andreas Schedler -- Opposition parties and incumbent presidents: the new dynamics of electoral competition in Africa / Lise Rakner and Nicolas van de Walle -- Legislative elections in hegemonic authoritarian regimes: competitive clientelism and resistance to democratization / Ellen Lust-Okar -- Opposition versus dictators: explaining divergent electoral outcomes in post-Communist Europe and Eurasia / Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik -- Judicial complexity empowering opposition? Critical elections in Armenia and Georgia / Bryon Moraski -- The contingent power of authoritarian elections / Andreas Schedler -- A theory of elections as a mode of transition / Staffan I. Lindberg

This volume studies elections as a core institution of liberal democracy in the context of newly democratizing countries. Political scientist Staffan I. Lindberg gathers data from every nationally contested election in Africa from 1989 to 2003, covering 232 elections in 44 countries. He argues that democratizing nations learn to become democratic through repeated democratic behavior, even if their elections are often flawed. Refuting a number of established hypotheses, Lindberg finds no general negative trend in either the frequency or the quality of African elections. Rather, elections in Africa, based on his findings, are more than just the goal of a transition toward democracy or merely a formal procedure. The inception of multiparty elections usually initiates liberalization, and repeated electoral activities create incentives for political actors, fostering the expansion and deepening of democratic values. In addition to improving the democratic qualities of political regimes, a sequence of elections tends to expand and solidify de facto civil liberties in society. Drawing on a wealth of data, Lindberg makes the case that repetitive elections are an important causal factor in the development of democracy. He thus extends Rustow's (1970) theory that democratic behavior produces democratic values.

Intro -- Contents -- List of Tables and Figures -- Preface -- 1 INTRODUCTION -- The Role of Elections -- Why Africa? -- On Regimes -- On Elections and Democracy -- Preindependence and Postindependence Elections in African Nations -- Contemporary Africa's Track Record -- Outline of the Book -- 2 ON DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS -- Making a Conceptual Choice -- Defining Democracy -- Operationalizing Democratic Qualities of Elections -- Data Collection and Processing -- 3 ELECTIONS IN AFRICA OVER TIME -- Frequency and Number of Elections -- The Democratic Qualities, on Average -- Democratic Qualities of Elections over Time -- Conclusions -- 4 THE SELF-REINFORCING POWER OF ELECTIONS -- Going from Bad to Worse -- First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Later Elections -- A Panel-Group Comparison -- Conclusions -- 5 THE CAUSAL EFFECTS OF ELECTIONS -- Democratic Qualities in Society -- A Missing Factor of Democratization -- Hypotheses and Causal Links -- 6 DEMOCRATIZATION BY ELECTIONS? -- Elections Are Associated with Civil Liberties -- Analyzing by Countries -- Conclusions -- 7 COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES AND REFLECTIONS -- The Transition Paradigm -- Corruption and Democratization -- Stateness and Social Citizenship -- Lessons on Consolidation -- Policy Implications -- The Power of Elections in Unfavorable Conditions -- Appendix 1. Overview of Elections in Africa, by Year -- Appendix 2. Changes in Civil Liberties Rankings -- Appendix 3. About the Freedom House Civil Liberties Index -- Appendix 4. A Data Set on Elections in Africa -- Notes -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Z.

Abstract: Findings in the social sciences too often turn out to be unstable because of the difficulty of and lack of incentives for replication. Bogaards' initiative to reexamine existing findings on the role of elections in democratization is laudable in principle. Yet, replication is a delicate art and Bogaards attempt is not entirely cogent. The cited works are not accurately presented; the original indicators and dependent variables are shifted making comparison with the original findings difficult at best; and his own analysis is distorted by the use of muddled, partially overlapping categories.

L'essor récent de « l'imputabilité » dans l'administration publique et le développement international semble s'écarter en partie de plusieurs siècles d'études conceptuelles et empiriques menées dans les disciplines connexes que sont la finance et la comptabilité et dans la science politique. Dans le présent article, nous rassemblons le sens fondamental de la notion d'imputabilité telle qu'utilisée dans des centaines d'études et tentons de mettre de l'ordre dans la litanie de sous-types présente dans cette littérature. Un système d'organisation à trois dimensions (source de contrôle, vigueur du contrôle et direction de la relation) permet d'appréhender les différents types d'imputabilité qui existent. La typologie qui en résulte indique par ailleurs que les différents sous-types présentent non seulement des acteurs et des caractéristiques différents, mais qu'ils cherchent aussi à défendre des valeurs variables et qu'ils sont confrontés à des défis différents. Ces observations ont des implications importantes pour la recherche et l('impossibilité) de traduire les conclusions d'un sous-type à un autre, de même que des implications pratiques pour le monde de la politique. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens L'imputabilité peut prendre différentes formes en fonction des acteurs (citoyens/politiciens, politiciens/bureaucrates, juges/citoyens). Ces types d'imputabilité visent à protéger des valeurs différentes et s'accompagnent de problèmes variables. L'imputabilité n'est cependant pas tout : il ne s'agit que de l'un des multiples moyens de limiter l'usage du pouvoir (ou l'abus de pouvoir). Dans le présent article, nous donnons des détails sur l'idée fondamentale d'imputabilité. Nous décrirons ensuite la gamme complète des sous-types avec leurs caractéristiques et leurs problèmes propres. Notre article sera utile aux décideurs et aux praticiens qui cherchent à faire face aux faiblesses de divers acteurs en matière d'imputabilité en prenant en considération leurs différences.

The recent surge in popularity of 'accountability' in public administration and international development seems in part divorced from centuries of conceptual and empirical work done in related disciplines of finance and accounting, and in political science. This article brings together the core meaning of accountability as used in hundreds of previous works, and seeks to bring order to the litany of subtypes in this literature. An organizing scheme with three dimensions (source of control, strength of control, and direction of relationship) captures all the existing varying types of accountability. The resulting typology also clarifies that varying subtypes have not only different actors and characteristics, but also seek to uphold varying values and are facing different challenges. These have important implications both for research and the (im-)possibility of translating findings from one subtype field to another; as well as practical implications for the policy world.Points for practitionersAccountability has several different forms depending on the actors (e.g. citizens–politicians; politicians–bureaucrats; or judges–citizens). These types of accountability seek to protect different values, and are accompanied by varying challenges. Yet, everything is not accountability: it is but one of many possible ways to constrain the (mis-)use of power. This article clarifies the core idea of accountability. It then depicts the full range of subtypes with their different characteristics and problems. This can function as a guide for policy makers and practitioners when seeking to address weaknesses in accountability of varying actors based on acknowledging their differences.

A vast literature suggests that voters in new democracies 'sell' their vote to patrons providing private or small-scale club goods, or, alternatively, that such goods are distributed along ethnic lines to reinforce ethnic voting. In either case the outcome is undermining democratic accountability. This study finds that citizens in one new democracy -- Ghana -- expect (and get) the patronage but at the same time engage in economic voting. Eighty-five percent of citizens first and foremost expect their legislators to supply private or small-scale 'club' goods. This acts as a strong incentive for politicians to actually supply such goods, which is confirmed by participants' observational data and more than 250 interviews conducted by the author. Despite this, citizens do not vote based on how well or how poorly incumbent MPs provide clientelistic goods. A multivariate analysis reveals that voting for the opposition or the incumbent is determined by evaluations of the state of the national economy and of the government's policies. What the literature has portrayed as an 'either-or' is 'both', and this is perfectly rational: Extract as much as one can in terms of private and small club goods but vote based on economic factors. The literature suggests that clientelism dominates elections in newer democracies and thus undermines democracy. The findings from this study suggest that while distribution of clientelistic goods is common, this does not necessarily undermine the mechanism of democratic accountability in elections. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]